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Direct democract decision-making is becoming increasingly popular as a means for deciding on public 
policy issues. Nearly half of the referendums
1 recorded worldwide have been conducted since 1970 
(Bjørklund, 1997). In many countries referendums supplement indirect democracy on local, regional 
and national levels, and typically are employed to decide on moral, territorial and constitutional issues 
(Gallagher et al., 1996).  
 
Referendums can generally be categorized as either advisory or binding (Stordrange, 1991). A binding 
referendum implements the election outcome subject to specified turnout and/or majority quorums. 
One example is the 1979 referendum on Scottish devolution. The U.K. parliament committed itself to 
implementing constitutional change on the dual proviso that a simple majority of the registered votes 
and at least 40% of the Scottish electorate supported devolution (Nairne et al., 1996)
2. Advisory 
referendums differ in that threshold and majority quorums are uncertain. Specifically, the referendum 
result constitutes advice to an elected institution such as parliament that considers and weighs both 
voter turnout and distribution of registered votes prior to deciding upon whether or not to implement 
the outcome of the referendum. In particular, an advisory referendum tends towards an opinion poll 
only and confers decreasing decisive influence on elected institutions as voter turnout declines. In the 
1955 Swedish referendum on traffic rules 83% of voters supported the prevailing convention of 
driving on the left. However, voter turnout was only 53,2%, and the Swedish parliament subsequently 
introduced right hand side driving laws (Bjørklund, 1997). One interpretation of this decision is that 
greater weight was attributed to voter turnout than to the recorded distribution of votes. 
 
Often referendums are employed in circumstances to secure legitimate change in the form of 
widespread popular support. The concern for legitimacy is reflected in practice by the specification of 
turnout thresholds in binding referendums and the implicit weight awarded to voter turnout in advisory 
referendums. In addition to being the most obvious manifestation of democracy, referendums have 
appealing efficiency properties. Much in the same way as prices in a market economy convey 
information about the marginal social valuation of goods, the distribution of votes reveal information 
about the social desirability of policy alternatives. Ledyard and Palfrey (1994 and 2002) forcefully 
                                                       
1 We use the word referendums, not referenda, as a plural form meaning ballots on one issue. In constrast, the Latin plural 
gerundive referenda ("things to be referred") connotes a plurality of issues (cf. Nairne et al. 1996, p. 100).  
2 In fact, a slight majority - 51.6% - voted in favour of Scottish devolution. But with a turnout of 62.9%, the "Yes" vote was 
32.9% of the electorate, and the status quo prevailed (Nairne et al. 1996). 3 
demonstrate the potential of referendums as information transmitters. They show how sophisticated 
preference revelation mechanisms in large electorates can be effectively replaced by simple schemes 
in which participants simply vote in favour of or against the implementation of a project and the 
project is implemented if and only if attracting a sufficient number of favourable votes. 
 
In as much as referendums generate socially valuable information, the participation and truthful 
expression voter opinion impose a positive externality on the rest of the electorate
3. Moreover, to the 
extent that participation is voluntary and voters do not internalise this “voting” externality, voter 
turnout levels below 100% will be sub optimally low from society’s point of view
4. Hence, an 
examination of the effect of different referendum types on voter turnout is of considerable interest 
with regard to social welfare. 
 
The objective of this paper is to analyse from a theoretical as well as an empirical perspective the 
effect of referendum type - binding versus advisory - on voter turnout. To this end we utilize a model 
in which voters, when deciding if and how to vote, weigh expected political influence and the value of 
it against the cost of voting. Political influence is a function of the expected probability of becoming 
the pivotal voter and the likelihood that the majority alternative is de facto implemented
5. The 
expected probability of becoming the pivotal voter depends negatively on the size of the electorate, but 
positively on the degree of electoral competition as measured by the inverse of the expected difference 
in the vote shares of the alternatives. The likelihood that the majority alternative is implemented is 
higher under binding than under advisory referendums. We find the following: if the size of the 
electorate is sufficiently large, there is a unique symmetric equilibrium in which voter turnout is higher 
under binding than under advisory referendums, decreasing in the size of the electorate and the cost of 
voting and increasing in the degree of electoral competition and the value of political influence. 
 
The empirical part of the analysis is a micro study of local Norwegian referendums concerning choice 
of language in schools. In 1885 the Norwegian parliament - Stortinget - established nynorsk as the 
second official language in addition to bokmål. Nynorsk is a written code based upon a wide range of 
                                                       
3 Naturally, voters who hold opposing beliefs are hurt by an individual’s decision to participate, but if the outcome of the 
referendum leads to the implementation of the socially efficient policy, the losers can, at least in principle, be fully 
compensated for their loss. 
4 This is true only in the absence of costs of voting. If there are costs of voting, the benefits of additional information must be 
traded off against the marginal cost of voting in the optimal mechanism.  
5 This is the standard “calculus of voting” approach taken by Downs (1957), Tullock (1967), Riker and Ordeshook (1968) 
and subsequently refined; see Aldrich (1993), Blais (2000) and Grossman and Helpman (2001) for surveys. As in Palfrey and 
Rosenthal (1983) and others, voters randomise between voting and abstaining. The additional feature considered in the 
present context is uncertainty as to the implementation of the outome. 4 
Norwegian dialects. Bokmål is a Norwegianized version of Danish, established as the conventional 
language of Norway during the approximately 400 years of union with Denmark, which ended in 
1814. Nowadays approximately 15% of Norwegians are taught and use nynorsk as their primary 
language. 
 
In 1892 Stortinget ruled that advisory local referendums should be employed to decide which of the 
two should be used as the primary teaching language in local school districts. The referendum rules 
were changed in 1915, so that a majority vote in a referendum was binding conditional upon at least 
40% of the electorate having participated. Henceforth we refer to these referendum rules as semi-
binding referendums. In 1985 Stortinget amended the rules yet again, and since then referendums have 
been advisory (Norges Lover, 2002).  
 
The empirical analysis below is based upon 230 referendums carried out during the period 1971-2001, 
84 of which were advisory (Adamiak, 2001)
6. One obvious advantage pertaining to this data set is its 
invariance with regard to topic, the implication of which is a control for the effect on turnout due to 
changes in the issues being decided upon in referendums. 
 
Consistent with theoretical predictions we find that semi-binding referendums display higher voter 
turnout than advisory referendums. All other things equal, a shift from an advisory to a semi-binding 
referendum leads to an average increase in voter turnout by 11.5 percentage points. In addition, voter 
turnout depends negatively on the size of the electorate, but positively on electoral competition. All 
effects are highly significant
7. 
 
The rationality of voting has been questioned ever since rational choice theory was first applied to the 
analysis of voter turnout. In large elections, it is argued; the impact of any single voter is so small that 
the net benefit of voting cannot possibly cover the cost of doing so. The obvious fact that voters 
nevertheless turn up in significant numbers has come to be known as the voting paradox. Some have 
taken the voting paradox so far as to question the whole application of rational choice to political 
science (Green and Shapiro, 1994), or economics, for that matter (Aldrich, 1997). We believe that the 
existence of a voting paradox is insufficient to discard rational choice, as a whole. With a sufficiently 
                                                       
6 In both cases a referendum was conducted after at least 25% of the electorate had actively supported it by signing a petition. 
7 Ours is not the first paper to empirically test the importance of electoral size and competition on voter turnout. Blais (2000) 
contains a survey of 36 studies that analyze how turnout depends upon the size of the electorate and/or the closeness of the 
election. The hypothesis that turnout decreases with the size of the electoral unit has been confirmed (disconfirmed) in eight 
(five) studies. The verdict is clearer with regard to closeness: in 27 of 32 studies closeness was found to increase turnout. We 
are not aware of any empirical study besides ours of the effect of referendum type on voter participation. 5 
small electorate, in our sample the electorate varies in size from 6 to a bit above 4000, with an average 
of 386, voter behaviour conforms extremely well to the predictions of rational choice theory. The 
failure of a theory to work in the large is no evidence that it will not work in the small. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section two presents the theoretical framework 
used to generate hypotheses against which the data are evaluated. The third section contains the data 
analysis. Concluding remarks are outlined in the last section. Some tedious calculations are relegated 
to appendix A. The data is contained in appendix B. 
2. Theory 
The following model is a variant of the one introduced by Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983). The members 
of the electorate randomise between participating and abstaining from voting. Consider a referendum 
in which voters may either support or oppose a given project. N denotes the size of the electorate. Each 
member  V of the electorate values her most preferred policy at b and the alternative at 0. The 
referendum is decided by simple majority rule (which is also the optimal voting scheme). However, 
the probability that the majority decision is actually implemented is only  ( ] 1 , 5 . 0 ∈ m (more on this 
below). There is a net cost  (2 1) cbm <−  of voting, which is identical for all voters. The net cost 
represents the cost of becoming informed plus “foot-sole” costs minus the intrinsic benefit of voting. 
Hence, c need not be positive. V’s expected utility of voting is 
 
  [] (1) ( 1) , vote U pm p m b c =+ −− −         (1.1) 
 
where  p  signifies the probability that V’s favoured policy wins when she participates in the election. 
p  depends on the number of voters who share V’s political views and the probability with which 
these voters actually vote, as well as the number of voters who do not share V’s political views and 
voter turnout in that group. V’s favoured policy is implemented if (i) it wins the referendum and the 
majority alternative is implemented or (ii) it loses the referendum, but the minority alternative is 
implemented. The probability of at least one of these events occurring is given by the term in brackets 
in equation (1.1). Multiply this by the value of winning - b - and subtract the cost of voting to obtain 
the expected utility of voting.  
 
The expected utility from abstaining is 
 6 
  [] ' (1 ')(1 ) . abstain U pp m b =+ − −         (1.2) 
 
V’s most favoured policy is still implemented if either (i) or (ii) above occurs, but now the probability 
of winning the election has reduced to  ' p  as V   no longer participates in the election.  ' p  depends on 
the same factors as  . p  By abstaining, the voter saves on the cost of voting at the expense of a lower 
probability of winning the referendum. Subtract (1.2) from (1.1) to obtain the net benefit of voting 
 
  (21 ) .
e u pm b c =− −           
 
When deciding whether to vote, the voter trades off her increased influence on the expected electoral 
outcome against the cost of voting.  '
e p p p =−  is the expected probability of being the pivotal voter, 
as V influences the outcome of the election if and only if she is the decisive voter. As shown in 
appendix A, 





















         (1.3) 
 
when the size of the electorate - N - is sufficiently large. q is the probability that a member of the 
electorate actually votes and ω  the expected fraction of the electorate who have the same policy 
preferences as V. In large elections, q is even voter turnout. In the remainder of the analysis we 
assume that voters behave as if the expected probability of being pivotal is exactly equal to (1.3). In 
interior equilibrium it must be the case that voters are indifferent between voting and staying at home. 
Hence equilibrium voter turnout z is implicitly given by  ( ,,) / ( 2 1)
e pz N c bm ϖ =− . Utilize (1.3), 
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where k is a constant. We maintain the following assumption throughout: 
 
                                                       
8 See Owen and Grofman (1984) and Mueller (1989) for derivations of a similar approximation for  0.5 q = . 7 









Assumption I is sufficient (but not necessary) to guarantee that the expected probability of being 
pivotal be decreasing in voter turnout. It is satisfied if either preferences are sufficiently polarized, i.e., 
ω  is very small or very large, or if the electorate is sufficiently large. Upon differentiating (1.4), the 
following is easily established: 
 
Proposition 1: Under assumption I there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium. Equilibrium voter 
turnout is (i) increasing in the likelihood m  that the majority alternative is implemented, (ii) 
increasing in the ”expected closeness” 
1 | 0.5| ϖ
− −  of the election, (iii) decreasing in the size N of 
the electorate, (iv) increasing in the valuation b  of the outcome and (v) decreasing in the cost cof 
voting. 
 
These results are fairly intuitive. Consider for example the effect of increasing the size of the 
electorate. An increase in N  leads to a reduced likelihood of becoming the pivotal voter, hence voter 
turnout drops. A drop in voter turnout leads to an increased likelihood of being the pivotal voter. 
Hence, voter turnout falls until the effect of the reduction in the size of the electorate is offset, keeping 
the equilibrium likelihood of being the pivotal voter constant. 
Referendum design 
The probability m  that the majority result is implemented depends crucially on referendum design. In 
a binding referendum politicians are obliged to implement the majority alternative. Hence,  1 m = . 
Adversely, in the advisory referendum case politicians are under no judicial constraint to implement 
the majority result. The election outcome produces merely advice that a legislature may or may not 
take into account. Consequently,  1 m ≤  under an advisory referendum. In light of proposition 1, we 
immediately obtain: 
 
Corollary 1: In symmetric equilibrium, voter turnout is (weakly) lower under an advisory than a 
binding referendum. 
 
The referendum rule employed in linguistic referendums in Norway between 1915 and 1985 
constitutes a semi-binding referendum type. It is advisory on the proviso that less than 40% of the 
electorate participates and becomes a binding referendum if voter turnout exceeds this threshold.  8 
 
Let  B z ,  A z  and  S z  be equilibrium voter turnout in the binding, advisory and semi-binding 
referendums, respectively, while x  denotes the threshold level above which the semi-binding 
referendum becomes binding. 
 
Proposition 2:  Under assumption I and in symmetric equilibrium, the following holds: ( i)  if the 
threshold is sufficiently high, voter turnout is the same in the semi-binding as in the advisory 
referendum ( SA zz =  if  B xz > ), (ii) if the threshold is sufficiently low, voter turnout is the same in the 
semi-binding as in the binding referendum ( SB zz =  if  A xz < ), (iii) for intermediate threshold levels, 
there are multiple equilibria, with voter turnout being either the same as in the binding or the advisory 
referendum ( { , } S AB z zz =  if  [ , ] A B x zz ∈ ). 
 
Proof: Under assumption I, ()
e p q  is decreasing in q. There are three cases to consider. Case (i): 
B xz > . Suppose qx > . Now everybody expects the referendum to be binding. All voters abstain 
since  ( )( )( ) /
eee
B p qp xp z c b << = . Hence qx >  cannot be an equilibrium. Suppose therefore 
that  qx ≤ . Now everybody expects the referendum to be advisory. The only possible symmetric 
equilibrium under an advisory referendum is  A q z x =< , hence  SA zz = . Case (ii):  A xz < . 
Suppose  qx < . In this case everybody expects the referendum to be advisory. All voters 
participate because  ( )( )( ) / ( 2 1)
eee
A pq px pz c bm >> = − . Thus qx <  cannot be an 
equilibrium. Suppose therefore that qx ≥ . Now everybody expects the referendum to be binding. 
The only possible symmetric equilibrium under a binding referendum is  B q z x => , hence 
SB zz = . Case (iii):  [ , ] A B x zz ∈ . Suppose expected voter turnout is qx ≤ . Now everybody 
expects the referendum to be advisory. In this case  SA zz =  is an equilibrium because  A zx ≤ . 
Suppose next qx ≥ . Now everybody expects the referendum to be binding. Now  SB zz =  is an 
equilibrium because  B zx ≥ . Hence, in this final case both  A qz =  and  B qz =  are equilibria.￿  
 
The intuition is straightforward. If the threshold is set very high, every voter knows that voter turnout 
will never be sufficiently high to generate a binding referendum and voters behave as if the 
referendum is merely advisory. Conversely, if the threshold is set very low, voters know that the 
referendum will always be de facto binding; hence behave as if it were binding from the outset. In the 
intermediate case, whether the referendum is binding or not depends on the beliefs about voter turnout. 
From proposition 2 one immediately obtains: 
 
Corollary 2: In symmetric equilibrium, voter turnout is (weakly) higher [lower] in the semi-binding 
than in the advisory [binding] referendum.    9 
 
Hence, we are able to rank expected voter turnout with respect to the degree of commitment the 
legislative authority attaches to the outcome of the referendum. The stronger is this commitment, the 
higher is voter turnout. We now turn to an empirical investigation of the propositions above. 
3. Evidence 
Overview 
The data set covers 230 referendums carried out between 1971 and 2001
9. The referendums were 
quasi-local in that the result applied to choice of language in school districts within municipalities. 
Also, in 97.4% of these cases nynorsk represented the incumbent and bokmål made up the opposition. 
These referendums were conducted in school districts located in 76 different municipalities. During 
the relevant time period, the total number of Norwegian municipalities has been approximately 435.  
 
Summary statistics relating to the key variables of interest are presented in Table 1. As can be seen 
from the second column, the average turnout in these referendums was 65%, and ranged between 
100% and 5.8%. Voter turnout is defined as the percentage of eligible electors within the relevant 
school district who vote.  
 
Table 1. Summary statistics 








Mean 0.651  0.518  0.727  386  23.719 
St.dev. 0.234  0.024  0.017  534  50.690 
Median 0.716  0.529  0.777  212  8.752 
Max 1  1  1  4127  ∞ 
Min 0.058  0.058  0.139  6  0 
 
In total, 84 (36.5%) of these referendums were conducted after 1985, and thus were necessarily 
advisory by law. The mean turnout in this case was nearly 52%. In contrast, the average voter turnout 
in the semi-binding case was above 72%. Moreover, the evidence reveals that voter turnout exceeded 
                                                       
9 The complete data set is listed in Appendix B. 10 
the required 40% threshold in 129 of 146 semi-binding referendums. Equivalently, 88.36% of these 
referendums were de facto binding
10. 
 
The table shows that the electorates were small, the average (median) being 386 (212) electors. Lastly, 
the closeness of the referendums is measured as the inverse of the difference in the vote shares gained 
by bokmål and nynorsk. A perfectly split vote produces infinite closeness, which did in fact occur 
twice. However, the average (median) inverse of the difference of vote shares was around 23.7 (8.75).  
Tests of hypotheses 
Proposition 1 asserts that equilibrium voter turnout is increasing in the expected closeness of the 
referendum and decreasing in the size of the electorate, while Corollary 2 predicts that turnout 
decreases when advisory referendum rules apply
11.  
 
We test these hypotheses by means of regression analysis. The following one-way random effects 
panel data model is employed to evaluate the effect of referendum type, electoral size and voter 
expectations on voter turnout:  
 
,, , , ,  0.5 i t A d v i s o r y it N it it i it VTD N e u ϖ αβ β β ϖ =+ + + − + +     (1.5) 
 
where subscript i denotes year (i∈{1971, 1972, …, 2001), and t signifies referendum in chronological 
order within any one year. The panel is unbalanced since the number of referendums within years 
varies (t∈{1, 2, .. , 18}). 
 
The dependent variable VT measures voter turnout in a referendum, and α is a constant term. The 
binary variable D measures the qualitative shifts of referendum rules, and assumes the value 1 when a 
referendum is advisory. N signifies electoral size, and the expected closeness of the referendum - 
| 0.5| ϖ −  - is measured by actual split in the vote between bokmål and nynorsk. ϖ  measures the 
fraction of the entire electorate who prefer nynorsk (or equivalently, bokmål). This is unobservable. In 
symmetric equilibrium, both nynorsk and bokmål voters vote with the same probability. Hence, the 
                                                       
10 In 6 of the 84 advisory referendums the municipal legislative disregarded the majority vote. Also, 2 of the 17 semi-binding 
referendums that turned out to be advisory due to insuffifient turnout levels resulted in decisions that contrasted with the 
majority vote. Ceteris paribus, this provides empirical support for the assumption made in section 2 above with regard to m - 
the probability of the majority alternative being implemented - being below 1 under advisory referendums. 
11 Equivalently, the theoretical hypotheses do not relate to turnout per se, but are evaluated with regard to predicted changes 
in turnout. Also see Grofman (1993). 11 
expected split in the election is identical to the split in the electorate. Since the average split is an 
unbiased estimator of expected split, we use actual split as an estimator of  . ϖ  Moreover, in order to 
avoid the case in which the explanatory variable equals infinity, closeness of referendums in 
represented in the regression by the absolute value of the actual split of vote shares instead of 
1 |0 . 5 | ϖ
− − . Consequently, theory in the form of Proposition 1 implies a negative value of the 
parameter βϖ.  
 
We do not include any lagged voter turnout variable in the model. Instead possible time effects are 
represented by ui, which is a random disturbance term pertaining to the ith year. The motivation for 
this model specification is twofold. First, the referendums were local and exhibited marked 
geographical heterogeneity. Also, in any school district at least 5 years had to pass prior to another 
referendum being conducted. Taken together, these factors imply neglicant intercorrelation between 
individual observations of turnout levels. Second, model specification tests validate the random effects 
approach. On the one hand a Lagrange test does not result in the rejection of the null hypothesis of no 
heterogeneity across years (p-value = 0.0674). Moreover, a Hausman-test does not imply the rejection 
of the null hypothesis of fixed-time effects (p-value = 0.2325).  
 
Both ui and the classical error term ei,t are assumed to be identically and independently distributed with 
zero mean and constant variance. The covariance between the two disturbance terms is assumed to be 
zero both within and across years (Greene, 2000):  
 
ei,t ~ iid()
2 , 0 ε σ               (1.6) 
 
u i ~ iid()
2 , 0 u σ               (1.7) 
 
E[ei,tuj] = 0, ∀i ∀t ∀j           (1.8) 
 
Table 2 contains the regression estimates. The model as fitted explains 51% of the variation in voter 
turnout levels. The principal result is that substituting advisory referendums for semi-binding 
referendums causes a statistically significant decrease in voter turnout by an average of 11.5 
percentage points. This corroborates Corollary 2. The estimates of βN and βϖ are both negative. Hence, 
voter turnout is negatively correlated with the size of electorate and divergence from a closely split 
vote. These effects are statistically significant and in line with Proposition 1. However, electoral size 12 
does not have much real impact on voter turnout. An increase in the size of the electorate by a hundred 
people leads to an average decrease in voter turnout by a mere 0.02 percentage points. Electoral 
competition is more important for voter turnout. A reduction in the difference in popularity of the 
alternatives by four percentage points, say from 55-45 to 53-47, leads to a one percentage point 
increase in voter turnout. Note finally that the model predicts average voter turnout to be below 86%. 
Maximal participation would occur in extremely close, semi-binding referenda with a small electorate.  
   
Table 2. Regression results  
Parameter Estimate  t-ratio  p-value
12 
α  0.858 41.105  0.0000 
βAdvisory  -0.115 -4.202 0.0000 
βN  -0.00023 -10.138  0.0000 
βϖ  -0.536 -5.910 0.0000 
Number of observations:         230                    R
2:          0.51 
 
Our empirical analysis does not include any estimators relating to the costs and benefits of voting. 
Adding such estimators would increase the explanatory power of the analysis, but requires access to 
information on how electors rate electoral alternatives and value the opportunity cost of casting votes. 
Such data are not available. The listed regression results will tend to be biased if benefits and costs are 
correlated with the employed explanatory variables. Nevertheless, we should not expect any degree of 
correlation between the variable of primary interest, i.e., changes of referendum type, and 
benefits/costs pertaining to individual referendums. Also, given the high degree of significance of our 
current estimators, we feel confident that introducing additional explanatory variables would not 
overthrow our fundamental predictions, namely that referendum type, the size of the electorate and the 
expected closeness of the election are significant determinants of voter turnout in direct democracy. 
 
Our theoretical model builds on the assumption that voters in their decision to vote trade-off the 
expected influence, measured by the probability of being pivotal, times the value of deciding on policy 
less the net cost of voting. This rational choice theory has been criticized from its inception. The main 
argument is simple. Large elections are often decided by majorities of tens of thousands and 
sometimes more. The likelihood of becoming the pivotal voter is infinitesimal under such 
circumstances. Hence, the benefit of voting is negligible. Consequently, each voter would better off 13 
staying at home if she believes that a significant proportion of the electorate intend to vote. The fact 
that voters in general do not stay at home has come to be known as the voting paradox.
13   
We believe that the voting paradox is not a problem here. Electoral size is very small in our dataset 
compared with most other studies. Some referendums had as few as six voters and only in one case 
were there more than 2700 eligible voters. Several referendums were decided with a small majority, 
ten of them with the smallest possible (one vote). Two of the referendums were actually a tie. In 
circumstances like these voter influence can be substantial. Utilising the data on electoral size, the 
closeness of the election and voter participation, one can calculate the equilibrium probability 
e p  of 
being pivotal. Considering only the referendums for which voter participation was below 100%, the 
probability of being pivotal was in one instance as high as one in five
14. In 65 of the elections, the 
probability of being pivotal was above one in one thousand. Given the importance of the question at 
hand, namely the choice of language in school, we would not be surprised to find the benefit of 
choosing policy to surpass the net cost of voting by a factor of one thousand.  
 
Although we feel confident utilising simple rational choice theory to explain voter participation in this 
setting, we do not wish to argue that voters use calculus only, when deciding whether to participate. 
Take for example the case of Vera school district in the municipality of Verdal. In 1977 the whole 
electorate (all six of them) unanimously decided to vote down the proposal to implement nynorsk. 
Here the most favoured policy would have been implemented irrespective of the absence of one or 
more voters. Owing to the small size of the electorate, it is not unlikely that all voters knew this in 
advance. Hence the expected probability of being pivotal was zero. Still people voted. Hence, some 
sort of social pressure may have driven people to the voting booth anyhow.        
4. Concluding remarks 
The key objective of this paper has been to analyse differences in voter turnout with regard to advisory 
and (semi-)binding referendums. In our theoretical model, expected voter turnout is smaller in semi-
binding than in binding referendums, but larger than in advisory referendums. Moreover, expected 
voter turnout is a decreasing function of the size of the electorate and the cost of voting, and an 
increasing function of the closeness of the election and the benefit of winning the election. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
12 The p-value for α (βAdvisory /βN /βϖ) is the value for a two-tailed (one-tailed) test of the hypothesis that the parameter equals 
zero. 
13 The voting paradox was described by Downs (1957) himself. See Mueller (1985) and Grossman and Helpman (2001) for a 
review of the criticism and attempts to escape the paradox. 14 
 
Field data from local Norwegian referendums corroborates the prediction that semi-binding 
referendums display higher voter turnout than advisory referendums. Thus, voter turnout increases 
with the decisiveness of the referendum. In addition, the empirical evidence confirms the residual 
theoretical hypotheses in as much as voter turnout depends negatively on the size of the electorate, but 
positively on electoral competition as measured by the expected closeness of the referendum.   
  
In political systems in which the referendum institution interacts with representative democracy, 
advisory referendum may produce referendum paradoxes: The majority of voters favour an alternative 
and the majority of members of a legislative its negation (Nurmi, 1998). One comparative advantage 
of binding referendums is the avoidance of such paradoxes in as much as such referendums produce 
decisive outcomes. Also, the analysis contained in this paper implies that binding referendums 
consistently generate higher voter turnout levels. Thus, if the core objective of referendum design were 
to maximise voter turnout, the implied policy recommendation would be straightforward: make all 
referendums binding. However, things are not so simple. Normally, the policy choice is between 
implementing a policy change and maintaining the status quo. As voters can sometimes be expected to 
know more about the status quo than about the proposed alternative, informational bias may be 
expected. Therefore, the design of socially optimal voting mechanism should weigh voter turnout 
against informational bias in the choice of threshold. To our knowledge, this trade-off between has yet 
to be explored. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
14 This was the case in the Garnes schooldistrict in the municipality of Verdal. In their 1980 referendum 46 people voted in 
favour of nynorsk and 45 against of a total of 95 eligible voters, yielding  (0.96, 0.005, 95) 0.19,
e
p ≈  where we have used (1.3). 15 
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Appendix A 
This appendix derives the large sample properties of 
e p , the expected probability of being pivotal. Let 
ϖ  and [1 ϖ − ] be the proportion of the electorate who prefer the project [not] to be implemented. If 
yes q  [ no q ] is the unconditional probability that a random “yes” [“no”] voter participates in the 
referendum and all voters make their decisions simultaneously and independently, the expected 
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and  (, ) P ⋅⋅  the probability that the “yes” alternative wins the election as a function of voter turnout. By 
majority rule,  ( ,)1 PXY =  for all  XY > ,  ( ,) 0 .5 PYY =  (both alternatives win with equal 
probability in case of a tie) and  ( ,) 0 PXY =  otherwise. If one “yes” voter drops out, the probability 






( ,, , ) (, 1 , ) (, ( 1 ) , ) ( , ).
N N
yes yes no yes no
YX













( ,1 , ) ( ,1 , 1 )




yes yes yes no
Y
hq N Y hq N Y






=−= − ∑  
 
For N sufficiently large, 
2 2 ( ,, ) ( 0 . 5 | ,) ( 0 . 5 | ,) hqMZ FZ FZ µ σ µ σ ≈+ −−  with 
2 ( |, ) F µ σ ⋅  the 
cumulative of the normal distribution 
2 ( |, ) f µ σ ⋅  with expectation  Mq µ =  and variance 18 
2 (1 ) Mqq σ =−  (see e.g. DeGroot, 1989). Let  yes yes Nq µϖ = , 
2 (1 ) yes yes yes Nqq σϖ =− , and define 
no µ and 
2
no σ  correspondingly. Consequently, 
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where the last equality follows from the property of the Normal distribution and where we have 
plugged in the relevant expressions. By repeating the same steps for the “no” voter, we arrive at 
precisely the same expression as above. Hence, “yes” and “no” voters face identical probabilities of 
                                                       
15 For continuous density, 
min max
2 () ( 0 . 5 ) ( 1 . 5 ) 2 () f Y FY FY f Y ≤+ −− ≤ , where 
max
( )( ) fYf X ≥  and 
min
( )( ) fYf X ≤  for all 
[ 1.5, 0.5] XY Y ∈− + . Since 
min max
( )( ) ( ) fYf YfY ≤≤  , we have 
max min
0 |( 0 . 5 ) ( 1 . 5 )2 ( ) |2 [ ( ) ( )] F YF Y f Y f Y f Y ≤+ − − − ≤ − . 
max min
( )( ) 0 fY fY −→  for  N→∞ implies  ( 0.5) ( 1.5) 2 ( ) F YF Y f Y +−−→  for  N→∞.   19 
becoming pivotal under the chosen approximation. In this case it seems reasonable to assume voter 
turnout to be the same for both groups, i.e.  yes no q q q == , although asymmetric equilibria may exist. 
Plug this into the equation above and simplify to obtain: 
 
 





















The data from the period 1971-2000 are reproduced from Adamiak (2001). The residual observations 
pertaining to 2001 have been collected from Noregs Mållag (www.nm.no). 
 
Voter turnout  Advisory (=1)  Electorate Closeness  Year  County  Municipality  School  district 
0,863  0  80  0,065 1971 Aust-Agder Birkenes  Engesland 
0,806 0  108  0,121  1971  Aust-Agder  Iveland  Iveland 
0,861 0  36  0,081  1971  Aust-Agder  Iveland  Vatnstraum 
0,800 0  145  0,095  1971  Oppland  Gausdal  Engjom 
0,401 0  724  0,097  1971  Oppland  Sel  Otta 
0,750 0  8 0,500  1971  Sør-Trøndelag  Osen  Brattjer 
0,140 0  236  0,348  1971  Sør-Trøndelag  Selbu Innstranda 
0,218 0  444  0,345  1971  Sør-Trøndelag  Selbu  Vikvarvet 
0,555  0  569  0,032 1971  Telemark Sauherad  Øvre  Sauherad 
0,741  0  81  0,100 1972 Aust-Agder Birkenes  Herefoss 
0,941 0  102  0,125  1972  Hedmark Folldal  Dalen 
0,685  0  89  0,057  1972  Møre og Romsdal  Nesset Vistdal 
0,673 0  49  0,015  1972  Nordland  Leifjord Tverlandet 
0,916 0  227  0,101  1972  Nord-Trøndelag  Inderøy  Røra 
0,768 0  538  0,113  1972  Oppland  Ringebu  Nord-Fåvang 
0,614 0  516  0,153  1972  Oppland  Ringebu  Nord-Vekkom 
0,789 0  90  0,021  1972  Oppland  Ringebu  Strand 
0,792 0  371  0,316  1972  Oppland  Fron  Ruste 
0,400 0  90  0,250  1972  Oppland  Sel  Selsverk 
0,724 0  76  0,100  1972  Oppland  Ringebu  Sør-Fåvang 
0,878 0  115  0,163  1972  Rogaland Lund  Hovsherad 
0,804 0  209  0,238  1972  Sør-Trøndelag  Rennebu  Berkåk 
0,789 0  38  0,233  1972  Sør-Trøndelag  Rennebu  Nerskogen 
0,734 0  335  0,037  1972  Vest-Agder  Vegårshei  Vegårshei 
0,554 0  148  0,317  1973  Aust-Agder  Gjerstad  Fiane 
0,650 0  143  0,210  1973  Aust-Agder  Gjerstad  Sunde 
0,649 0  239  0,003  1973  Aust-Agder  Gjerstad Gjerstad 
0,701 0  67  0,011  1973  Aust-Agder  Gjerstad  Ungdomsskulen 
0,828 0  180  0,037  1973  Buskerud  Gol  Herad 
0,941  0  17  0,500  1973  Møre og Romsdal  Smøla Edøy 
0,963  0  27  0,367  1973  Møre og Romsdal  Molde Sekken 
0,748  0  246  0,125  1973  Møre og Romsdal  Gjemnes Batnfjordsøra 
0,785  0  256  0,027  1973  Møre og Romsdal  Halsa Halsa/Blekken 
0,832 0  149  0,161  1973  Nord-Trøndelag  Levanger  Ekne 
0,667 0  18  0,417  1973  Nord-Trøndelag  Nærøy  Lund 
0,858 0  106  0,082  1973  Nord-Trøndelag  Levanger  Okkenhaug 
0,764 0  237  0,036  1973  Nord-Trøndelag  Inderøy  Sandvollan 
0,836 0  152  0,256  1973  Nord-Trøndelag  Snåsa  Breide 
0,741 0  135  0,080  1973  Nord-Trøndelag  Levanger  Tuv 
0,917 0  12  0,409  1973  Sør-Trøndelag  Snillfjord  Fenes 
0,525 0  322  0,311  1973  Sør-Trøndelag  Orkdal  Årlivoll 
0,646 0  257  0,072  1973  Vest-Agder  Marnardal  Øyslebø 
0,267 0  60  0,313  1974  Hordaland  Bømlo  Espevær 
0,681 0  251  0,237  1974  Hordaland Bømlo  Hillestveit 
1,000  0  25  0,020  1974  Møre og Romsdal  Molde Bolsøya 
0,270 0  274  0,243  1974  Rogaland  Randaberg  Grødem 
0,914 0  70  0,031  1974  Sør-Trøndelag  Snillfjord  Å 
0,818 0  110  0,067  1974  Vest-Agder  Marnardal Bjelland 
0,725  0  149  0,065  1975  Møre og Romsdal  Rindal Bolme 
0,788  0  212  0,063  1975  Møre og Romsdal  Rindal Rindal 
0,862  0  29  0,020  1975  Møre og Romsdal  Rindal Skogen 
0,354  0  353  0,468  1975 Nord-Trøndelag Steinkjer  Lø 
0,413 0  80  0,409  1975  Nord-Trøndelag  Nærøy  Værum 
0,377 0  69  0,462  1975  Rogaland  Tysvær Stegaberg 21 
0,705 0  302  0,303  1975  Sør-Trøndelag  Skaun  Børsa 
0,316 0  98  0,113  1975  Sør-Trøndelag  Midtre  Gauldal  Hauka 
0,629 0  278  0,271  1975  Telemark  Drangedal Kroken 
0,794  0  262  0,024  1976  Møre og Romsdal  Molde Vågsetra 
0,714 0  119  0,076  1976  Nord-Trøndelag  Levanger  Finne 
0,776 0  416  0,063  1976  Nord-Trøndelag  Inderøy Sakshaug 
0,835  0  418  0,010  1976 Nord-Trøndelag Steinkjer  Beitstad 
0,877 0  220  0,034  1976  Nord-Trøndelag  Inderøy  Utøy 
0,614 0  88  0,204  1976  Oppland  Gausdal Svatsum 
0,273 0  860  0,147  1976  Sør-Trøndelag  Orkdal  Grøtte 
0,773 0  66  0,206  1976  Sør-Trøndelag  Rennebu  Havdal/Gisnås 
0,738 0  187  0,130  1976  Sør-Trøndelag  Rennebu  Voll 
0,150  0  1160  0,374  1977  Møre og Romsdal  Ålesund Lerstad 
0,744  0  203  0,030  1977  Møre og Romsdal  Ålesund Grimstad/Lorgja 
0,861  0  79  0,118  1977  Møre og Romsdal  Nesset Vistdal 
0,955 0  177  0,038  1977  Nord-Trøndelag  Verdal  Ness 
0,714 0  21  0,233  1977  Nord-Trøndelag  Verdal  Sul 
1,000 0  6 0,500  1977  Nord-Trøndelag  Verdal  Vera 
0,948  0  135  0,055  1977 Nord-Trøndelag Steinkjer  Lysheim 
0,699 0  269  0,218  1977  Oppland  Nord-Aurdal Leira 
0,630 0  467  0,272  1977  Rogaland  Randaberg  Goa 
0,891 0  211  0,218  1977  Rogaland Sauda Austarheim 
0,932 0  59  0,027  1977  Rogaland  Rennesøy  Bru/Sokn 
0,886 0  140  0,065  1977  Sør-Trøndelag  Skaun  Venn 
0,732 0  220  0,140  1977  Sør-Trøndelag  Meldal  Grefstad 
0,510 0  147  0,233  1977  Sør-Trøndelag  Meldal  Å 
0,860 0  57  0,092  1977  Telemark Nome  Kjeldal 
0,875 0  24  0,357  1977  Telemark Nome  Kleppe 
0,875 0  32  0,393  1977  Telemark Nome  Svenseid 
0,827 0  133  0,155  1978  Buskerud Rollag  Rollag 
0,772 0  193  0,077  1978  Hordaland Fjell  Knarrevik 
0,190  0  990  0,170  1978  Møre og Romsdal  Ålesund Åse 
0,806  0  165  0,192  1978  Møre og Romsdal  Fræna Malmefjorden 
1,000 0  30  0,000  1978  Nordland Hattfjelldal Grubben/Hattfjelldal 
0,736 0  87  0,219  1978  Nord-Trøndelag  Levanger  Markabygd 
0,795 0  210  0,249  1978  Nord-Trøndelag  Levanger  Reithaug 
0,752 0  137  0,131  1978  Nord-Trøndelag  Levanger  Tuv 
0,951  0  81  0,097  1978 Nord-Trøndelag Steinkjer  Vålen 
0,271 0  634  0,081  1978  Rogaland  Sola  Røyneberg 
0,707 0  184  0,246  1978  Rogaland  Gjesdal  Oltedal 
0,646 0  277  0,036  1978  Rogaland Klepp  Orstad 
0,756  0  213  0,140 1978 Rogaland  Karmøy Stokkastrand 
0,879 0  182  0,138  1978  Vest-Agder  Songdalen  Finsland 
0,800 0  90  0,111  1979  Nord-Trøndelag  Inderøy Lyngstad 
0,738 0  107  0,006  1979  Nord-Trøndelag Steinkjer  Følling 
0,796 0  206  0,177  1979  Rogaland  Eigersund  Helleland 
0,853 0  320  0,148  1979  Vest-Agder  Vegårshei  Vegårshei 
0,783 0  92  0,208  1980  Aust-Agder  Evje/Hornnes Lia 
0,894 0  104  0,038  1980  Aust-Agder  Froland  Mykland 
0,886  0  246  0,018  1980  Møre og Romsdal  Tingvoll Straumsnes 
0,958 0  95  0,005  1980  Nord-Trøndelag  Verdal  Garnes 
0,844 0  302  0,010  1980  Nord-Trøndelag  Verdal  Vuku 
0,809 0  141  0,088  1980  Sør-Trøndelag  Melhus  Gåsbakken 
0,700 0  40  0,036  1980  Sør-Trøndelag  Rennebu  Nerskogen 
0,982 0  109  0,089  1981  Hedmark Folldal  Dalen 
0,764  0  441  0,337  1981 Nord-Trøndelag Steinkjer  Beitstad 
0,778  0  90  0,257  1981 Nord-Trøndelag Steinkjer  Moen 
0,770  0  226  0,052  1981 Nord-Trøndelag Steinkjer  Skarpnes 
0,856  0  111  0,058  1981 Nord-Trøndelag Steinkjer  Flekstad 
0,804 0  240  0,070  1981  Oppland  Ringebu  Kjønås 
0,923 0  91  0,333  1981  Sør-Trøndelag  Midtre  Gauldal  Hauka 
0,736 0  292  0,095  1981  Sør-Trøndelag  Midtre  Gauldal  Soknedal 
0,689 0  196  0,070  1981  Sør-Trøndelag  Rennebu  Voll 
0,897  0  78  0,086 1981  Telemark Sauherad  Hjuksebø 22 
0,773  0  181  0,086 1981  Telemark Sauherad  Øvre  Sauherad 
0,663 0  89  0,127  1982  Hordaland Fjell  Bjorøy 
0,822  0  309  0,020  1982  Møre og Romsdal  Molde Vågsetra 
0,776 0  58  0,122  1982  Sør-Trøndelag  Snillfjord  Ven 
0,240 0  329  0,386  1983  Hordaland  Bergen Hjellestad 
0,261 0  403  0,443  1983  Hordaland  Bergen  Kaland 
0,886 0  149  0,129  1983  Hordaland  Bergen  Krokeide 
0,143 0  742  0,491  1983  Hordaland  Bergen  Søreide 
0,304 0  392  0,130  1983  Hordaland  Bergen  Haukås 
0,300 0  510  0,278  1983  Hordaland  Bergen  Liland 
0,675  0  280  0,225  1983  Møre og Romsdal  Aukra Riksfjord 
0,788 0  52  0,061  1983  Nordland  Vestvågøy  Valberg 
0,473  0 368  0,098  1983  Rogaland  Gjesdal Berland 
0,878 0  98  0,093  1983  Sør-Trøndelag  Skaun  Viggja 
0,878 0  148  0,185  1983  Sør-Trøndelag  Meldal  Å 
0,771 0  327  0,139  1983  Sør-Trøndelag  Orkdal  Årlivoll 
0,718 0  71  0,147  1983  Telemark  Drangedal  Brødsjø 
0,790 0  62  0,010  1983  Telemark  Drangedal  Henseid 
0,962  0  52  0,020  1984  Møre og Romsdal  Gjemnes Heggem 
0,668 0  313  0,117  1984  Nord-Trøndelag  Verdal  Stiklestad 
0,838 0  197  0,155  1984  Nord-Trøndelag  Inderøy  Utøy 
0,806  0  144  0,026  1984 Nord-Trøndelag Steinkjer  Røysing 
0,905 0  190  0,041  1984  Vest-Agder  Songdalen  Finsland 
0,700 1  257  0,094  1985  Hordaland  Bergen  Nordvik 
0,145  1  1131  0,110  1985  Møre og Romsdal  Ålesund Spjelkavik 
0,821  0  212  0,126  1985  Møre og Romsdal  Tingvoll Straumsnes 
0,865  1  260  0,113  1985  Møre og Romsdal  Sunndal Løykja 
0,906 0  106  0,156  1985  Nord-Trøndelag  Snåsa  Breide 
0,559 1  929  0,034  1985  Nord-Trøndelag  Høylandet  Høylandet 
0,868  0  114  0,126  1985 Nord-Trøndelag Steinkjer  Sem 
0,191 1  209  0,400  1985  Nord-Trøndelag  Verdal  Sør-Leksdal 
0,560 1  550  0,136  1985  Oppland  Lesja  Lesjaskog 
1,000 0  66  0,106  1985  Oppland  Ringebu  Sør-Fåvang 
0,684 1  212  0,052  1985  Telemark  Drangedal  Henseid 
0,864 0  206  0,219  1985  Vest-Agder  Sirdal  Tonstad 
0,443 1  271  0,008  1986  Aust-Agder Åmli  Nelaug 
0,560  1  464  0,085  1986  Møre og Romsdal  Rindal Bolme 
0,499  1  757  0,032  1986  Møre og Romsdal  Rindal Rindal 
0,534  1  163  0,109  1986  Møre og Romsdal  Rindal Skogen 
0,554  1  224  0,161  1986  Møre og Romsdal  Rindal Lomundsjø 
0,618 1  246  0,007  1986  Nord-Trøndelag  Verdal  Nord-Leksdal 
0,526 1 1400  0,130  1986  Oppland  Nord-Fron Sødorp 
0,648 1  125  0,241  1986  Sør-Trøndelag  Rennebu  Nerskogen 
0,737 1  338  0,155  1986  Vest-Agder  Marnardal Bjelland 
0,365 1  941  0,083  1987  Hordaland Fjell  Foldnes 
0,356  1  59  0,405  1987  Møre og Romsdal  Nesset Gussiås 
0,743 1  338  0,157  1987  Nord-Trøndelag  Verdal  Garnes 
0,323  1  1811  0,119  1987 Nord-Trøndelag Steinkjer  Mære 
0,388  1  183  0,106  1987 Nord-Trøndelag Steinkjer  Rygg 
0,182 1 2165  0,115  1987  Rogaland  Sola  Stangeland 
0,867 1  369  0,003  1987  Vest-Agder  Marnardal Laudal 
0,601 1  409  0,102  1988  Oppland  Gausdal Svatsum 
0,861 1  144  0,073  1988  Rogaland  Rennesøy  Bru 
0,274 1 1781  0,246  1988  Rogaland Sauda  Fløgstad 
0,274  1  1000 0,245 1988  Telemark Notodden  Rygi 
0,630 1  827  0,118  1989  Hordaland  Bergen  Nordvik 
0,766  1  304  0,178  1989  Møre og Romsdal  Rauma Innfjord 
0,539  1  334  0,083  1989  Møre og Romsdal  Rindal Skogen/Løfall 
0,381 1  755  0,007  1989  Sør-Trøndelag  Rennebu  Voll 
0,392 1  375  0,051  1990  Telemark  Drangedal  Brødsjø 
0,357 1  675  0,073  1990  Telemark  Drangedal Kroken 
0,706 1  524  0,189  1990  Vest-Agder  Audnedal Byremo 
0,609 1  481  0,145  1991  Buskerud Rollag  Rollag 
0,358  1  1254  0,119  1991  Møre og Romsdal  Nesset Eidsvåg 23 
0,520 1  256  0,169  1991  Nord-Trøndelag  Verdal  Nord-Leksdal 
0,098 1 4127  0,204  1991  Rogaland  Gjesdal  Ålgård 
0,527 1  486  0,156  1991  Vest-Agder  Kvinesdal  Gjemlestad 
0,222 1 1466  0,149  1993  Hordaland  Bergen  Kyrkjekr. 
0,363 1  936  0,015  1993  Nord-Trøndelag  Verdal  Vuku 
0,420 1  443  0,075  1993  Oppland  Nord-Aurdal  Vestringb. 
0,384 1 1780  0,087  1993  Rogaland  Karmøy  Vedavågen 
0,285 1 1021  0,098  1994  Aust-Agder  Gjerstad Gjerstad 
0,381  1  352  0,075  1994 Nord-Trøndelag Steinkjer  Flekstad 
0,501 1  728  0,070  1994  Sør-Trøndelag  Rennebu  Voll 
0,529 1  255  0,004  1995  Aust-Agder Åmli  Nelaug 
0,598 1  850  0,051  1995  Telemark  Drangedal Kroken 
0,547  1  825  0,032  1996  Møre og Romsdal  Gjemnes Batnfjord 
0,510 1  886  0,277  1996  Rogaland  Rennesøy  Bru/Mosterøy 
0,989 1  280  0,132  1997  Buskerud Rollag  Rollag 
0,647 1  300  0,000  1997  Hedmark Folldal  Dalen 
0,129 1 2700  0,174  1997  Hordaland  Bergen  Ådnamarka  og 
0,327  1  150  0,235  1997  Møre og Romsdal  Aure Nordlandet 
0,191 1 1280  0,357  1997  Oppland  Ringebu Vekkom   
0,761 1  347  0,042  1997  Rogaland Lund  Heskestad 
0,537 1 1203  0,305  1997  Rogaland  Rennesøy  Rennesøy 
0,608 1  347  0,002  1997  Sør-Trøndelag  Skaun  Jåren-Råbygda 
0,358 1  424  0,059  1997  Telemark  Tinn  Bøen 
0,654 1  405  0,006  1997  Vest-Agder  Marnardal Laudal 
0,656 1  500  0,070  1997  Vest-Agder  Kvinesdal  Vesterdalen 
0,480 1  829  0,080  1998  Nord-Trøndelag  Verdal  Vuku 
0,070 1 3053  0,308  1999  Rogaland  Sola  Sande   
0,058 1 3053  0,110  1999  Rogaland  Sola  Stangeland 
0,911 1  90  0,037  1999  Vest-Agder  Audnedal Byremo 
0,750 1  152  0,246  2000  Aust-Agder  Gjerstad Gjerstad 
0,960 1  25  0,042  2000  Buskerud  Hol  Skurdalen 
0,547 1  633  0,191  2000  Hordaland  Bergen  Liland 
0,465  1  480  0,025  2000  Møre og Romsdal  Ålesund Flisnes 
0,389  1  126  0,357  2000 Nord-Trøndelag Steinkjer  Skarpnes 
0,733  1  86  0,151  2000 Nord-Trøndelag Steinkjer  Flekstad 
0,444  1  365  0,302  2000 Nord-Trøndelag Steinkjer  Mære 
0,813 1  48  0,218  2000  Nord-Trøndelag  Verdal  Volden 
1,000  1  48  0,083  2000 Nord-Trøndelag Steinkjer  Vålen 
0,714 1  161  0,013  2000  Rogaland  Sandnes  Sviland 
0,331 1  800  0,013  2000  Rogaland  Sola  Håland 
0,668  1  205  0,113 2000  Telemark Notodden  Rygi 
0,680  1  125  0,018 2000  Telemark Notodden  Yli 
0,811 1  106  0,244  2000  Vest-Agder  Kvinesdal  Vesterdalen 
0,841  1  82  0,094 2000 Vest-Agder  Hægebostad Kollemo 
0,258 1  322  0,283  2001  Hordaland  Bergen  Nordvik 
0,181  1  1781  0,186  2001  Møre og Romsdal  Fræna Haukås 
0,312 1 1185  0,073  2001  Oppland Etnedal  Etnedal 
0,529 1  736  0,071  2001  Rogaland  Sandnes  Sviland 
 